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BARNET AS TR. OF 2012 SARETTA BARNET REVOCABLE TR. V. 
MINISTRY OF CULTURE & SPORTS OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC, 




I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE  
Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr. v. Ministry 
of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 961 F.3d 193 (2d 
Cir. 2020) centers around a bronze horse figurine dating back to 
the Geometric period (8th century BCE), which is “of Corinthian 
type.”1 For an object that has been in existence well over 2,000 
years, relatively little is known about the figurine. According to 
the limited provenance, the earliest date the figurine is known was 
May of 1967 when it was sold by a prominent auction House in 
Switzerland to an undisclosed buyer.2 Later, though it is unknown 
exactly when, the Bronze horse was acquired by Robin Symes 
from the previous auction purchaser, and on November 3, 1973, 
Howard and Saretta Barnet acquired the bronze horse from Mr. 
Symes.3 The Bronze Horse was displayed in the Barnet’s New 
York home for more than twenty years, and when Howard passed 
away, Saretta became the sole owner.4 In 2012, Saretta transferred 
ownership to the 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Trust (“the 
Trust”), and when she passed away in 2017 the Trust consigned 
the figurine for auction at Sotheby’s Auction House in New York 
City.5  
 
* Meghan Jackson is a 2022 DePaul University College of Law J.D. Candidate. 
Meghan graduated from Loyola University Chicago in 2017, where she received 
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receiving a Classics Distinction. Meghan is focusing her legal studies in the 
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1 Barnet v. Ministry of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 391 F. Supp. 
3d 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
2 Id. at 297.  
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr. v. Ministry of Culture & 
Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 961 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2020). 
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Sotheby’s intended to auction the bronze horse in New York 
City on May 14, 2018.6 In anticipation of auction, Sotheby’s 
published an auction catalogue, detailing the bronze horse, 
attributing its country of origin as Greece, and dating the figurine 
to the 8th Century BCE.7 Several days prior to the intended auction 
date, on May 11, 2018, the Greek Ministry of Culture emailed a 
letter (the “demand letter”) to Sotheby’s, making the following 
several points:  
• That Greece was aware of the bronze horse intended to be 
auctioned,  
• That the bronze horse is of Greek origin,  
• That Greece has no record to prove that the bronze horse 
left Greece legally,  
• That under Greek law, all movable ancient monuments 
belong to Greece, and there are potential criminal 
consequences to illegal acquisition of such monuments, 
• Greece is in full compliance with international treaties 
preventing the illicit export of cultural property,  
• That there is in force a Memorandum between the United 
States and the Government of the Hellenic Republic that 
restricts import of archaeological objects during a certain 
period which this figurine falls under, 
• And finally, arguably most importantly, asking Sotheby’s 
to withdraw the bronze horse from auction and repatriate 
the object to Greece, reserving the right to take necessary 
legal action for such repatriation.8  
Sotheby’s did indeed withdraw the figurine, but instead of moving 
forward with repatriation, they responded to the email, asking 
Greece to provide more evidence to support their claim to 
ownership.9 Greece did not respond, and Sotheby’s, in conjunction 
 
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 197-98.  
9 Id. at 198.  
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with the Trust, sued in the Southern District of New York for 
declaration of ownership.10 
II. BACKGROUND OF GREEK PATRIMONY LAWS AND THE 
FSIA  
Before delving into the court decisions, it is important to 
understand Greece’s Patrimony Laws, as they are central to the 
outcome of this case. “The material remains of ancient Greece 
played a crucial role in shaping national consciousness and 
legitimizing the modern Greek state…”11 With a cultural heritage 
as rich as Greece’s, it is obvious that protection of such heritage 
would be of great importance, and that importance is reflected in 
the country’s legislation. One such law was the Antiquities Act of 
1932, stating that “[a]ll antiquities movable or immovable found in 
Greece and in any State land, in rivers, lakes and at the bottom of 
the sea, and in municipal, monasterial and private estates from 
ancient times onwards, are the property of the state.”12 The 
Antiquities Act also places fines up to 4,000 drachmas on those 
who come to possess property of Greece and who do not declare it 
as soon as possible, as well as potential imprisonment up to sixth 
months.13 In 2002, Greece enacted the On the Protection of 
Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in General Act. This Act states 
that “the Greek State shall care for the protection of cultural 
objects originating from Greek territory whenever they have been 
removed from it” and “wherever they are located.”14 The 2002 Act 
also provides that “[m]oveable ancient monuments dating up to 
1453 belong to the State in terms of ownership and possession, are 
imprescriptible and extra commercium,” meaning not subject to 
private ownership.15  
 
10 Id.  
11Daphne Voudouri, Law and the Politics of the Past: Legal Protection of 
Cultural Heritage in Greece, 17 IJCP 547 (2010).  
12 Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr., 961 F.3d at 196.  
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. 
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 Across the pond, the United States has laws instructing its 
courts on how to deal with litigation involving other countries. 
While the U.S. court system prides itself on resolving conflicts and 
seeking justice, foreign policy and diplomacy discourage the 
courts from entangling foreign sovereigns in disputes that could 
affect the relationships between the U.S. and other nations. For 
this reason, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) 
establishes the default rule that a foreign sovereign is typically 
immune from all litigation in United States courts, unless one of 
the specific exceptions in the statute applies.16 Since its enactment 
in 1976, the FSIA has been continually litigated, despite the fact 
that the intention was actually to create a uniform rule of sovereign 
immunity. This case is no exception, because the central issue is 
whether one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity 
applies such that Greece is subject to jurisdiction in the United 
States courts to determine the true ownership of the figurine.  
The issue in this case centers on whether the so called 
“commercial activity exception” applies to actions taken by 
Greece in an attempt to claim ownership of the bronze horse. More 
specifically, the parties dispute the direct-effect clause of the 
commercial activity exception, which abrogates sovereign 
immunity when an action is based upon “an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
effect in the United States.”17 To establish jurisdiction on that 
basis, the action must be (i) based upon an act outside the United 
States; (ii) that was taken in connection with a commercial activity 
of the foreign sovereign; and (iii) that caused a direct effect in the 
United States.18 The first element requires the court to identify the 
act of the foreign sovereign that is the “core” of Plaintiff’s suit, the 
specific act for which relief is sought.19 Next, the court must 
identify the activity in connection with which the core act was 
taken. It is crucial to determine whether that act is commercial and 
 
16 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 352 (1993). 
17 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).  
18 See Petersen Energia Inversora S.A.U. v. Argentine Republic & YPF S.A., 
895 F.3d 194, 204 (2d Cir. 2018). 
19 OBB v. Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 396 (2015).  
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can be exercised by private citizens, or if it is a “power peculiar to 
sovereigns.”20 As the statute itself provides, “[t]he commercial 
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the 
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, 
rather than by reference to its purpose.”21 The third and final 
element simply requires an affect “followed as an immediate 
consequence of the defendant’s activity,” and the effect “need not 
be ‘substantial’ or ‘foreseeable.’”22 
III. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DECISION 
Despite the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity laid 
out by the FSIA, the District Court held that the direct-effect 
clause of the commercial activity exception was satisfied in this 
case, and therefore the court had jurisdiction over Greece.23 The 
court’s analysis started by recognizing the “core” claim from 
which this dispute arises was the Defendant’s demand letter, and 
its error in “asserting an ownership interest in the Bronze Horse 
when demanding that Sotheby’s withdraw the figure from the 
auction.”24  
With the first element satisfied, the District Court moved to 
the core question of the case, whether Greece was engaged in 
commercial activity. “[T]he issue is whether the government’s 
particular actions (whatever the motive behind them) are the type 
of actions by which a private party engages in commerce.”25 The 
court describes this activity as “attempting to intervene in the 
market to assert and enforce its purported rights,” and classifies 
that characterization as the type of commercial activity private 
 
20 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 570 U.S. 349, 360 (1993) (quoting Republic of 
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).  
21 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
22 Atlantica Holdings v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, 813 F.3d 
98, 108 (2d Cir. 2016). 
23 Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 302. 
24 Id. at 299.  
25 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (emphasis in 
original).  
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persons can, and often do, engage in.26 The District Court rejected 
Greece’s contention that they were acting as sovereigns by 
explaining that “[w]hile the purpose of sending the Demand Letter 
may have been to fulfill the Ministry’s constitutional mandate to 
protect Greece’s cultural heritage, the nature of the act is 
analogous to a private citizen attempting to enforce his property 
rights.”27  
The final element is whether the Demand Letter had a 
direct effect in the United States. This element is obvious, as the 
Demand Letter caused Sotheby’s to withdraw the Bronze Horse 
from the auction one business day before it was set to take place.28   
With every element of the direct-effect clause of the 
commercial activity exception satisfied, the District Court held 
that it had jurisdiction over Greece to hear the case.29 The effect of 
this holding is that any foreign state who sends a demand letter 
claiming ownership over an object has effectively waived its 
sovereign immunity under the FSIA and thereby agreed to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Displeased with the 
outcome, Greece appealed to the Second Circuit.30  
IV. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DISTRICT 
DECISION 
 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the 
District Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.31 The Court of 
Appeals agreed with the lower court that the core act challenged in 
this suit was the Defendant sending of the demand letter.32 
However, that is where the agreement ended. According to 
the Court of Appeals, the District Court erred in their conclusion 
 
26 Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 300.  
27 Id. (emphasis in original) 
28 Id. at 301.  
29 Id. at 302.  
30 Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr. v. Ministry of Culture & 
Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 961 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2020). 
31 Id. at 195.  
32 Id. at 200.  
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that the act was commercial in nature rather than sovereign.33 The 
Court of Appeals explained that the District Court incorrectly 
treated the act of sending the letter as the core act and the related 
commercial activity required by 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), which, the 
court said, is impossible because “a single act cannot be 
undertaken in connection with itself.”34 Instead, the Court of 
Appeals concludes that “Greece undertook the act of sending the 
letter in connection with its claim of ownership over the figurine 
pursuant to its patrimony laws.”35 The court categorizes this claim 
of ownership as sovereign because “Greece has claimed ownership 
over the figurine by adopting legislation that nationalizes historical 
artifacts and by enforcing those patrimony laws.”36 This 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Demand Letter sent by 
Greece explicitly invokes such national laws at the same time the 
assertion of ownership is made.37 As the court makes clear, “[n]o 
private party could nationalize historical artifacts and regulate the 
export and ownership of those nationalized artifacts – that is the 
activity in connection with which Greece sent its letter.”38 The 
Court of Appeals completely disagrees with the District Court’s 
“nature v. purpose” analysis, saying that the nature of the act was 
not a commercial claim of ownership, but “the enactment and 
enforcement of laws declaring the figurine to be state property.”39  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the direct-
effect clause of the expropriation exception is not satisfied, and 
therefore the District Court has no jurisdiction over Greece, and 
the case was remanded for dismissal.40 The court recognized that 
“to ‘hold otherwise and look only to the fact of a mere claim of 
ownership for purposes of our commercial activity analysis would 
allow the exception to swallow the rule of presumptive sovereign 
 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr., 961 F.3d at 201.  
37 Id. at 200.  
38 Id. at 202.  
39 Id. at 201.  
40 Id. at 203.  
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immunity codified by the FSIA.’”41 Shortly after the case was 
decided, a spokesperson for Sotheby’s said “[w]hile we are 
disappointed with yesterday’s decision, it does not impact what is 
at the heart of this matter—there is, and remains, no evidence to 
support Greece’s claim to ownership of the bronze sculpture. We, 
together with our client, are reviewing next steps.”42 These next 
steps, however, did not result in further litigation, as no appeal was 
ever made to the United States Supreme Court.  
V. IMPACT ON FUTURE LITIGATION 
The Court of Appeals’ reversal and dismissal seemingly hinges 
on two errors by the district court: assuming that a single demand 
letter could satisfy both the act and the related commercial 
activity, and its classification of Greece’s assertion of ownership 
as commercial not sovereign. Looking further into the first point, 
the Court of Appeals explained that there ought to be an act and a 
separate commercial activity to which the act is connected, citing 
just the statute itself and a 1994 case from the D.C. Circuit, which 
only hints at such point.43 Addressing the second error made by 
the District Court, the Court of Appeals then seems to alter course, 
explaining that the act of sending the letter was “in connection 
with its claim of ownership over the figurine pursuant to its 
patrimony laws.”44 The Court of Appeals effectively found that a 
sovereign activity may exist within the same act that it had just 
decided could not contain commercial activity. While that 
undermines the logic the Court of Appeals used to disagree with 
the District Court, it also raises an interesting question: what if 
Greece didn’t have patrimony laws? Assume, in arguendo, that 
Greece’s demand letter was sent in connection with its claim of 
ownership over the figurine but lacked the patrimony laws 
explicitly nationalizing objects such as the bronze horse. Private 
 
41 Id. at 202 (quoting Anglo-American Underwriting Management v. P.T. 
Jamsostek, 600 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2010).  
42 Kate Brown, Sotheby’s Just Lost Its Lawsuit Against Greece over 8th-Century 
BC Horse Statue—and the Decision May Have Lasting Implications for the 
Trade, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/barnet-case-sothebys-1883349. 
43 Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr., 961 F.3d at 202.  
44 Id.  
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citizens often assert claims for ownership of a commercial nature. 
It seems that the Court of Appeals decision then leaves open the 
possibility that other foreign sovereigns lacking such ownership 
laws attempting to assert ownership via demand letter may be 
subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts, while others like Greece 
enjoys immunity.  
This case is similar to many FSIA claims because boiled down 
to a decision of whether the act taken by Greece was commercial 
or sovereign in nature. As is made obvious by the difference in 
interpretation between the District and Appellate Courts, this is not 
always an obvious distinction. There are acts that can easily be 
identified as sovereign: the exercise of police power45, seizure of 
farmland46, granting or denying exchange rate compensation akin 
to subsidy47, or even “clandestine surveillance or espionage.”48 
There are, on the other hand, acts that courts have deemed 
commercial, such as: entering and subsequently breaching 
contracts,49 and issuance of bonds.50 It is also a difficult but crucial 
to the FSIA standard, that in making that determination a court 
 
45 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) (“The conduct boils down 
to abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi Government, and however 
monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the 
power of its police has long been understood for purposes of the restrictive 
theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.”). 
46 Sequeira v. Republic of Nicaragua, 815 F. App'x 345, 351 (11th Cir. 
2020), cert. denied sub nom. Sequeira v. Nicaragua, No. 20-428, 2020 WL 
7132327 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2020) (“The commercial-activity exception does not 
apply here because Sequeira's amended complaint was based on the alleged 
taking of his land, which is not a commercial activity.”). 
47 Corzo v. Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519, 525 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“the BCRP's act of granting or denying exchange rate compensation is clearly a 
sovereign activity, and it is therefore not subject to suit in the United States on 
this particular claim.”). 
48 Broidy Capital Mgmt., LLC v. State of Qatar, 982 F.3d 582, 594 (9th Cir. 
2020) (“We have little difficulty in concluding that, without more, a foreign 
government's conduct of clandestine surveillance and espionage against a 
national of another nation in that other nation is not ‘one in which commercial 
actors typically engage.’”). 
49 Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 2000), as 
amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Aug. 17, 2000). 
50 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607. 
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must look at the nature, and not at the purpose of an act to 
determine whether it was commercial or sovereign.51 At face 
value, sending a demand letter asserting ownership seems more 
similar to entering a contract or issuing a bond than it does 
espionage or exercise of police power.  
Indeed, it seems more logical to look at the demand letter as 
having the nature of asserting ownership, and the purpose of 
enforcing its patrimony laws. This scenario feels similar to that in 
Weltover, where Argentina unsuccessfully argued that its issuance 
of bonds was “to fulfill its obligations under a foreign exchange 
program designed to address a domestic credit crisis, and as a 
component of a program designed to control that nation's critical 
shortage of foreign exchange.”52 The Supreme Court was 
unconcerned with why the bonds were issued, just that the issuance 
of bonds is a commercial activity. So logically, it should not 
matter why Greece sent a demand letter asserting ownership, just 
that it did so, and such is the kind of commercial act that “can also 
be exercised by private citizens.”53  
 A final issue with the outcome of this case was a point 
made by Sotheby’s: Greece had not at any point come forward 
with any documentation to indicate actual ownership. Would it not 
have been easier to provide Sotheby’s with proper documentation 
and move forward with repatriation privately than to go through 
two years of litigation? It is not completely unreasonable to guess 
Greece’s refusal to provide documentation was simply because it 
does not have any. If that is the case, how can Greece assert 
ownership pursuant to its Patrimony Laws as a sovereign state, if it 
not certain it does indeed have a rightful claim to the figurine? 
There are many cases, such as this one, where the merits of a claim 
and jurisdiction cannot be easily separated.54 It leaves the courts 
with the almost impossible decision of deciding what facts ought 
 
51 Id. at 617.  
52 Id. at 616.  
53 Id. at 614.  
54 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 
137 S. Ct. 1312, 1318-1319 (2017). 
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to be analyzed at the outset of a case involving a foreign 
sovereign, and there is likely no right way to approach such a task. 
What then, should Sotheby’s have done differently?  
Ultimately, the Second Circuit chose the path that does not 
offend the principles of sovereign immunity. The consequences of 
the District Court’s decision would likely have had a chilling 
effect on countries attempting to assert ownership over 
nationalized object, which is certainly an undesirable outcome. 
Under the FSIA, waiver of immunity is one way a foreign state 
can be subject to litigation in the United States, and obviously 
initiating an action in a U.S. court constitutes a waiver.55 The 
District Court’s opinion would subject a foreign state to 
jurisdiction for sending a demand letter the same way it would for 
filing a complaint, effectively providing a massive hole in the 
shroud of immunity enjoyed by foreign states.  
An objective of the FSIA was to codify a the so-called 
‘restrictive’ principle of sovereign immunity, as presently 
recognized in international law. “Under this principle, the 
immunity of a foreign state is ‘restricted’ to suits involving a 
foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to 
suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis). This 
principle was adopted by the Department of State in 1952 and has 
been followed by the courts and by the executive branch ever 
since. Moreover, it is regularly applied against the United States in 
suits against the U.S. Government in foreign courts.”56 
The Second Circuit opinion serves as a “reset” on the 
theory of restrictive sovereign immunity and effectively makes 
countries freer to assert ownership claims without worrying about 
being subject to U.S. litigation. Indeed, the United States has 
formally recognized Greece’s ownership claims to many objects in 
the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of 
the United States and the Government of the Hellenic Republic 
Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of 
 
55 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). 
56 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).  
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Archaeological and Byzantine Ecclesiastical Ethnological Material 
Through the 15th Century A.D. of the Hellenic Republic (“the 
Memorandum”).57 The Memorandum recognizes a desire to 
“reduce the incentive for pillage of irreplaceable archaeological 
material of Greece…” and both countries agree to take certain 
steps to meet this goal, including the U.S. returning any objects of 
a certain type to Greece if forfeited to the U.S.58 Therein lies an 
ideal that Greece has a right to assert ownership over certain 
objects, the bronze horse being of the appropriate type, and 
subjecting Greece to potential litigation every time it makes such a 
claim of ownership would likely have a significant impact its 
willingness to do so, while undermining the entire purpose of the 
Memorandum.  
Because of the worldwide nature of the market surrounding art 
and cultural heritage, cases revolving around these objects will 
often face jurisdictional obstacles, and invoking any exception to 
the FSIA is always a tough hurdle for claimants. Each artwork or 
cultural object has a unique story to tell, which results in litigation 
involving intricate facts that Congress could have never 
anticipated in drafting the FSIA. It then falls on the courts to 
resolve such complicated issues, and Barnet is no exception.  
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